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COMPETITIVE TENDERING: A MOVE FOR EFFICIENCY 
OR AN ATTACK ON THE NHS? 
Ruth Fletcher 
Over recent years the present Government has pursued an extensive 
programme of privatisation. The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
exercise of competitive tendering, which the government has imposed with 
great persistence on the National Health Service. The paper aims to assess, 
by examining the impact of competitive tendering on job conditions, 
standards of service and industrial relations, how the government rhetoric 
about 'efficiency' relates to deeper political objectives. 
What is Competitive Tendering? 
The process of competitive tendering involves testing the cost 
effectiveness of a service by putting it to tender so that the in-house service 
will be subject to competition from the private sector. This is not strictly the 
same as privatisation but clearly has the potential to produce the same 
effect. 
While the Government have been promoting competitive tendering in 
the NHS since as early as 1980, it was only in 1983 with the issue of DHSS 
circular HC(83)18(I) that the prerogative of choice was removed from 
Health Authorities. The circular not only stated a preference for the 
practice of competitive tendering but also a clear preference for the use of 
private contractors. It is important to note also that in the policy guidelines 
for the appraisal of tenders, the circular clearly places price as the most 
important appraisal criterion, not service quality. 
English Experience 
Despite Government claims that competitive tendering introduces 
competition which results in improved efficiency and financial savings, 
evidence from England paints a quite different picture. In the first instance, 
competition was largely eliminated in the first round of tendering by the 
virtual duopoly of the two leading conglomerates BET and the Hawley 
Group (who between them held 60% of the domestic market share at 
March 1988<2>). 
Secondly, claims of improved efficiency are much weakened b~ 
widespread evidence of disastrous service standards<3>. Domberger et al<) 
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Secondly, claims of improved efficiency are much weakened b~ 
widespread evidence of disastrous service standards(3l. Domberger et at<) 
carried out a study to assess the cost implications of competitive tendering 
and to see if the process resulted in the same benefits that had been 
highlighted by previous research into competitive tendering of refuse 
collection<5>. Although they found that similar savings were possible, there 
was a marked difference in the quality of service provided. Contractors' 
failure was "far more widespread than was encountered in our earlier study 
of refuse collection"<6>. The Joint NHS Privatisation Research Unit 
(JNPRU)<7> found contract failure to be particularly high among private 
contractors (at May 1987 the Market leaders BET and Hawley had failure 
rates of22% and 25% respectively.) The Unit feels that this poor service is 
largely responsible for many English health authorities restoring contracts 
to the in-house team in the second round of tendering. 
Thirdly, the extent of financial savings claimed, (Domberger et al 
estimated 20% "achievable cost reductions"<8l and the National Audit 
Office re~orted 22% savings on private contracts and 21% on in-house 
contracts >) is somewhat dubious when considered alongside extra costs 
incurred by competitive tendering, which are not included when calculating 
savings. (The nature of such costs will be discussed below). Even 
government publications give evidence that savings are being made at the 
expense of the already low-paid staff: "savings have arisen mainly from ... 
Jess favourable conditions of employment, greater use of rart time staff, 
changes in working practices and increased productivity"<10 . 
COMPETITIVE TENDERING IN SCOTLAND 
This section outlines the stages of the competitive tendering exercise in 
Scotland, looking at the different responses of Scottish health boards, more 
recent developments designed to alter that response, the reaction of the 
trades union movement, and the present situation. 
Round 1: The Early Circulars 
The Scottish Office circular 1983(GEN)13(ll, coinciding with the 
original DHHS HC(83)13, received considerably less attention than its 
equivalent south of the border, the Boards being generally against any form 
of privatisation in the NHS. In June 1984 the Scottish Home and Health 
Department (SHHD) issued another circular, 1984( GEN) 14, "to stimulate 
further progress towards seeking tenders for services". Despite receiving 
reports of progress being made in efficiency programmes, the Minister was 
not satisfied. He insisted that "the achievement of savings depends on 
seeking tenders for particular services". The tone of this circular was 
considerably more insistent that the last, stating that by the end of December 
1984 all boards (except the Islands) were to have put to tender the domestic 
and catering services for their own head offices and for at least two hospitals 
135 
r 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1990 
per board. 
There followed considerable debate among health boards about 
whether the exact status of this circular was that of a mandatory directive or 
not. The Scottish Health Minister, was evasive on this point, stating simply 
that as appointees of the Secretary of State, health boards were answerable 
to him and to Parliament. Legal advice was sought by unions who were 
informed that the circulars put no statutory duty on health boards to 
comply<12). 
At this point the health boards became divided in their approach to the 
department directives and there followed a period of meetings at the 
various boards to decide on their policy. During this period individual 
unions sought to demonstrate their opposition to the proposal and a series 
of strikes and demonstrations spread throughout the country. It would be 
impractical to list all the action taken as much of it involved lightning strikes 
around the country, but major strikes and demonstrations took place in 
Fife, Tayside, Lothian and Lanarkshire areas. The largest of these was a 
demonstration in Fife by several thousand ancillary workers coming from 
Fife, Tayside, Lothians, the West Coast, Glasgow and as far afield as the 
Highlands. This demonstration, consisting of a march and rally, coincided 
with the Boards decision as to their tendering policy and was intended "to 
focus and enlist Rublic support against government attempt to sell off the 
health service"<L l. The sizes of subsequent demonstrations ranged from a 
few hundred to about 3,000. 
While this action did indicate the strength of opposition, and was 
undoubtedly a major influence on the decisions of some boards, notably 
Fife and Lothian, it was not successful in all cases. Table 1 summarises the 
position of the boards once all decisions had been made. At this point 
Scottish health boards seemed to be split down the middle. However, even 
those that did accept tendering proposals did so in the spirit rather than the 
letter of the circulars, concentrating mostly on non-hospital services. 
Meanwhile it was reported that the Health Minister had written to the 
five rebel health boards making it clear that he would "continue to insist on 
competitive tendering being the only firm test of the savings available". He 
called on these boards to submit a report by April1985 on savings planned 
and secured, "not ruling out the possibility of using his powers to direct 
them if co-operation is not forthcoming. He could ultimately find board 
members to be in default and dismiss them"<14l. This clearly indicates the 
government's determination to implement competitive tendering, 
regardless of the efficiency agreements that boards had implemented in its 
place. 
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Table 1: Position of Scottish Health Boards re Tendering Proposals. 
HEALmBOARD ACCEPTED REJECTED 
Argyll and Clyde X 
Ayrshire X 
Borders X 
Dumfries & Galloway X 
Fife X 
Forth Valley X 
Grampian X 
Greater Glasgow X 
Highlands X 
COMMENT 
In-house service only 
feasible tender 
This, the first decision, 
received largest lobby. 
Unions saw it as victory. 
J. Balfour, board chairman 
denied they had succumbed 
to union pressure. 
But only for non-hospital 
services. 
Concrete agreement drawn 
up with unions to achieve 
savings. The agreement 
intended to operate unti11991, 
including a moratorium on 
privatisation. 
Board Chairman: "the 
board's responsibility is to the 
patients and with that in mind 
it was in the interest of the 
patients to put off any 
question of privatisation. 
Islands Health Boards Not Applicable: excluded from government proposal. 
Lanarkshire X Agreed to take on a pilot 






Whilst this open battle between the unions, the health boards and the 
Health Minister was raging over the decision whether or not to follow the 
government proposals the following developments were taking place in the 
Scottish Office which were to pave the way for the smoother 
implementation of competitive tendering in later stages. 
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(i) The Change in Health Minister 
John MacKay and his successor Lord Glenarthur had become 
increasingly insistent that health boards should comply with SHHD 
circulars on competitive tendering but the current Health Minister, 
Michael Forsyth, was to adopt a much more determined and authoritarian 
approach. In the words of a Scottish Health Service Campaign report "the 
position is now filled by someone with a fierce ideological commitment to 
the free-market and an enthusiasm for Health Service privatisation which 
was not to be found in his predecessors". 
The Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) claim that Forsyth's 
"highly co-ordinated strategy" has involved the collaboration of senior 
Scottish Office civil servants, health board general managers and the 
contracting industry "to ensure that private contracting is forced on 
Scottish health boards". Their claim is supported by evidence of meetings 
arranged by Mr Forsyth with board general managers and representatives 
of contracting companies which were not reported or publicised in any way. 
One such meeting in the Highlands established that the department letter 
(see below) "conveyed a direction from the Minister"<15>. The purpose of 
such meetings was apparently to exclude the health unions, the STUC and 
other opposing parties and to allow the implementation of a co-ordinated 
programme of contracting out. 
(ii) The Morison Letter 
An SHHD letter of December 1987<16> was of considerable significance 
in changing board policy. In comparison to previous circulars the Morison 
letter (so called after its signatory Hugh Morison) was far more insistent in 
its tone, which was that of a legal directive. For example in paragraph 6 it 
states "there should be no question of boards considering whether they 
propose to achieve" the programme (my emphasis). Furthermore, it refers 
to section 2 of the 1978 National Health Act in which boards will be bound 
by a "direction" made by the department. This started once again the 
debate about the legal status of the circulars. STUC assistant secretary Bill 
Speirs sought clarification from the SHHD and was told that the letter was 
not a direction. While Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State, and Michael 
Forsyth have both been evasive about the exact legal status of the letter, 
Forsyth makes his interpretation quite clear: 
"Health boards are appointed by the Secretary of State to act on his 
behalf ... and they are under an obligation to do so in accordance with 
government policies"<17>. In a parliamentary question he stated "the 
letter of 11 December ... sets out firm instructions by the Secretary of 
State on action boards are to take, and they are obliged to implement 
them". 
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The impact of the letter on board policy has been considerable and 
even those boards still largely opposed to competitive tendering felt that 
they were now forced to comply. One such board was Argyll and Clyde, 
which previously rejected competitive tendering in favour of making 
efficiency agreements with the unions. Mr J Ryan, Chairman of the board 
clearly indicated his opinion by stating that existing services were efficient 
and he could not see how privatisation could bring any substantial savings. 
He felt that the board had been forced into compliance with competitive 
tendering proposals and told protesters that if the board refused to comply, 
they faced the imposition of Scottish Office appointed commissioners to 
implement the proposals(IS). 
The Reaction of the Trade Union Movement 
As the_ boards entered this second phase of competitive tendering 
many of them were in the position of having made efficiency agreements 
with the unions on the understanding that competitive tendering would not 
be introduced. In Grampian the board and unions had actually signed a 
comprehensive agreement including a moratorium on privatisation, which 
was to last until1991. Therefore, as the boards began to change their minds, 
health workers (particularly those in Grampian who had already saved the 
board £2m in just one year) expressed their bitterness in one of the 
strongest union campaigns to have taken place in the NHS. From the 
beginning of the year union members were 'voting with their feet' and 
coming out in sporadic action around the country. Throughout January 
there was a series of walk-outs and lobbies as health boards came to their 
decisions on whether to invite private tenders. In Lothian 30 hospitals were 
affected as 2,000 staff staged a 24 hour stoppage, in Greater Glasgow 
several thousand members demonstrated at the board's offices, and in 
Ayrshire and Arran 1,000 workers attended a lobby and presented a 
petition of 16,000 signatures opposing privatisation. Many more 
demonstrations occurred after decisions had been taken. Action also 
sprang up in traditionally more moderate areas such as the Highlands. 
This wave of action was initiated largely by the Joint Trade Union 
Committees of individual health boards but was not backed up by any 
organised STUC campaign, other than a propaganda campaign similar to 
that operated in previous stages. From February, however, the STUC 
claimed its support for the rolling programme of protest action. Such action 
was widespread around the country and was taken by NHS employees from 
a range of occupations. Much of the action was sporadic and poorly 
organised and in some hospitals workers were coming out in numbers of 
less than ten, the impact of which was often limited. But there was 
particularly well supported action in the Lothian and Greater Glasgow 
areas. For example on the lOth February 1988, over 1,000 workers staged a 
24 hour strike affecting eight hospitals around Glasgow. On the 5th 
February, 385 ancillary and nursing staff from Edinburgh Royal Infirmary 
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walked out and were supported by the stoppage of 500 administrative and 
clerical staff. 
While this programme of action was perhaps poorly organised the 
main focus of attention of the campaign, the national NHS DAY OF 
ACfiON (February 24th) was well planned in advance and actively 
supported by the STUC. The Health Minister attempted to dampen 
support for the action, issuing statements like, "The Trade unions are 
organising an attack on patient care in order to oppose competitive 
tendering which will increase the resources available for the sick. I hope all 
those NHS staff who know where their interests lie will not abandon their 
patients to join a politically motivated campaign"<19l. 
Despite this, the support of health workers, sections of the wider trade 
union movement and of the public remained strong. On the Day of Action 
the numbers involved far exceeded expectations. The following are the 
figures reported by the Glasgow Herald 25/2/88: 
Location 













However, estimates of numbers attending such demonstrations are 
notoriously unreliable and other figures quoted range from 50,000 (Times 
25/3/88) to 70,000 (NUPE). Furthermore, there was some opposition to the 
STUC campaign. A small number of members of the pressure group Public 
and Local Services Efficiency Campaign (PULSE) picketed the STUC 
offices to voice their protest against strike action. 
Nevertheless, the strength of public support had been in little doubt 
from the beginning of the campaign. This has been backed up by the result 
of two separate opinion polls, the System Three poll commissioned by the 
STUC and a poll organised by NUPE of visitors to hospitals in the 
Monklands district. The table below highlights the major findings. The 
support illustrated by these results was also found to cross the boundries of 
political affiliation. 
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Table 2: Public opinion on NHS Questions 
NB Monkland's PoD: survey of 1172 visitors to hospitals in Monkland's 
district on 24 February 1988. 
System 3 PoD: survey of 968 respondents in 39 Scottish constituencies 
over the period 26th February to 6th March 1988. 
QUESTION MONKLAND'S POLL SYSTEM 3 POLL 
( 1172 respondents) (968 respondents) 
Are you for or against the introduction 
of competitive tendering for hospital 
services? 
AGAINST: 
Do you believe that privatisation of 
hospital services will improve health 
care? 
NO: 
Do you think that health service staff, 
including nurses, would be justified in 
taking industrial action over the future 
oftheNHS? 
YES: 
In the next budget the Chancellor ofthe 
Exchequer will be able to choose 
between cutting income tax by 2p in the 
pound or putting an extra £2 billion 
into the NHS. Which do you think he 
should choose? 




Source: Scottish Health Service Campaign Report: 
"System 3 NHS Opinion Poll Results" March 1988 




Throughout this period of action the health unions made offers to call off 
the industrial action if Mr Forsyth would withdraw his circular instructing 
boards to put services out to tender. He continued to boast that he refused 
to be pressurised by the unions: "I want to make it clear that there is no 
possibility of industrial action of this nature changin§ the government's 
policy on competitive tendering for ancillary services"< OJ. Partly due to the 
Minister's intransigence and partly from a fear of losing the support of the 
public, the STUC NHS privatisation sub committee entered a 'new phase' 
in their campaign. It was agreed that "the campaign strategy be modified to 
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a) protect the positiOn of staff currently directly threatened by 
competitive tendering and privatisation 
b) focus directly on the government and in particular on Health 
Minister, Michael Forsyth 
c) step up pressure on those companies considering bidding for NHS 
contracts"<21 l. 
What this effectively amounted to was an admission that competitive 
tendering was here to stay and all that remained was to try to ensure that the 
in-house bids were satisfactory to staff and for patient care, while at the 
same time being sufficiently competitive to compete with private firms. 
This was the dilemma now facing the unions, these two objectives hardly 
being compatible considering that under SHHD instructions boards are 
unable to specify wages and conditions as a condition of tender and that 
since the abolition of the Fair Wages Resolution, contractors are not bound 
by Whitley conditions. 
The first step in the 'new phase' of the STUC campaign was to suspend 
all industrial action to allow meaningful negotiations with the Scottish 
Office. Any further action would be a matter for individual unions but 
would not receive official STUC backing. Many among the rank and file 
were disappointed at this move, seeing it as an acceptance that competitive 
tendering was here to stay and almost an admission of defeat. 
Over the next few months there continued to be signs of this split 
between some of the more militant groups among the rank and file and the 
official union approach. The former continued to organise sporadic 
industrial action and this was particularly noticeable in the Lothian region 
where NUPE had announced that any action arising would have full union 
support. Having voiced such support however, the union was not prepared 
to organise any action itself, leaving such decisions to the members of 
individual hospitals. While action did arise for the first few weeks following 
Lothian health board's decision to privatise certain services, the 'rolling 
campaign' was soon to peter out. 
Over the same period the official NUPE line had fallen into step with 
the STUC line that it was now important to concentrate on co-operation 
with local management in preparation of in-house tenders to make them as 
competitive as possible. However, this was not necessarily possible for local 
union branches. In Glasgow and Lothian particularly, where the unions 
had previously been most adamant in their non-cooperation, local 
management were now excluding them for tender preparation despite 
offers of cooperation. This proved to be disastrous for the ancillary services 
as it was in these areas that most private contractors were successful. From 
this point onwards the unions' remaining weapons were to persuade 
members not to accept re-employment with private contracts (and we will 
see later that staff shortages have been a major problem for some 
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companies) and to discredit the contractor's performance. 
The latest move in the STUC's campaign has been to challenge health 
boards through the courts about the procedures being used to evaluate 
tenders which are seen as discriminating against NHS employees. The 
claim relates to the 'hidden costs' of outside contractors (see below) which 
are not considered in the evaluation of their tenders. Such a legal move was 
made in Lothian on 24 May 1989 when a petition was lodged for an interim 
interdict on the health board regarding the awarding of another domestic 
contract. This hearing however was dropped after the board announced 
that no decision would be made on the contract until at least June 22nd. The 
Union felt that they had at least achieved a delay in the process. 
The Current Position in Scotland 
Table 3 below outlines the outcomes of all contracts awarded by the 
end of May 1989. Competitive tendering is an ongoing process and there 
are a considerable number of contracts currently in the process of being 
tendered. Most of these are for domestic and catering services although 
there is an increasing number of 'multiple-service contracts' going to 
tender, which cover the whole range of hotel-type services used in hospitals 
and clinics. Some health boards are even considering putting a much wider 
range of services out to tender. In Forth Valley feasibility studies are 
currently underway to decide on the competitive tendering of pharmacy, 
laboratory, X-ray and medical records services. However, this appears to 
be the exception rather than the rule. 
We can see from the table that most of the health boards have 
responded in one of two ways, either to wholeheartedly embrace the policy, 
showing a definite preference for contracting out, or to follow the proposals 
to their minimum requirements and preferring to keep services in-house. 
Overall 80.4% of contracts let so far have been awarded in-house which 
woud appear to indicate either a lack of acceptable tenders from private 
contractors or a reluctance in health board management to contract out. 
There are, however, a few important exceptions to this. These are the areas 
where there has been most controversy over the tendering results: Greater 
Glasgow, Grampian and Lothians. Greater Glasgow in particular has 
demonstrated its commitment to the principle of competitive tendering and 
indeed to the privatisation of services. Half of the contracts so far awarded 
in the area have gone to private companies. 
In Grampian, where four contracts have been awarded, the private 
contractor Mediguard won two of these. The decision to award Mediguard 
the contracts greatly shocked the unions and some board members since 
three separate reports expressed grave concern about the quality of the 
tender. One report, from the West Midlands Regional Health Authority, 
states that "the Mediguard tender proposed input hours which in our 
opinion would not be sufficient to guarantee that the contract standard 
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Table 3: Outcome of Tendering to end of May 1989 
Health Board Service Contracts Contracted 
In-house Out 
Argyll & Clyde Domestic 3 
Catering 2 
Aryshire & Arran Domestic 3 
Catering 2 
Vehicle Maintenance 1 
Borders Domestic 1 
Catering 1 
Dumfries& Domestic 1 
Galloway Catering 1 
Fife Domestic 1 1 (Initial Health 
Care Services) 
Catering 2 
Forth Valley Domestic 2 
Catering 2 
Grampian Domestic 2 (Mediguard) 
Catering 1 
Greater Glasgow Domestic 4 10 (IHCS, Hospital 
Hygiene, Dysart, 
Sunlight) 
Catering 8 1(Sodexho) 
Porte ring 1 (IHCS) 
Highlands Domestic 1 
Catering 1 
Laundry 1 (Lairg Electric) 
Lanarkshire Domestic 7 
Catering 1 
Lothian Domestic 2(IHCS) 
Catering 2 
Grounds & Gardens 4 
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would be met"(ZZ). Concern was also expressed about the level of sickness 
allowance, the quality of training and the racial equality policy. However, 
the real controversy arose when confidential minutes were leaked showing 
that Mediguard had clinched the deal by offering 650 extra hours at no cost 
to the board. Other confidential documents indicated that in-house bids 
had been rejected at an early stage without the chance for re-submission. 
These revelations naturally aroused suspicions about unfair bias in favour 
of the private company. There was similar controversy in Lothian when the 
successful bidder, Initial Health Care Services (IHCS) had put in tenders 
which were just marginally lower in price and which left certain gaps in the 
service provision. 
Why then, we might ask, should different health boards respond in 
such different ways? It is interesting to note that with the exception of 
Tayside, all those boards which are now contracting out are those which 
previously rejected competitive tendering altogether. This can not be 
entirely coincidental, but is likely to be closely connected with the NHS 
mana:5ement reforms implemented following the Griffiths report in 
1984( l. This report attacked the existing structure of consensus 
management in which decisions were reached by the consensus of a number 
of representatives of different interests (e.g. administrator, a financial 
manager, a nursing officer and a doctor). To replace this system, Griffiths 
proposed the appointment of a General Manager at district and unit levels, 
who was to "accept personal responsibility for developing management 
plans" and to provide the "driving force" that was currently lacking. 
The proposals were not well received by the unions, nor by the Social 
Services Select Committee investigating the report. The most important 
objection has been that the reforms have been found to lead to a 
centralisation of power into the hands of the Secretary of State through 
General Managers. I think that it is here that we can find the reason for the 
extremes in the health board policy. By their rejection of the government 
proposals in early 1984, these health boards became priority targets for 
management reform. The General Managers appointed in these areas, 
particularly in Glasgow, Grampian and Lothian, have proven to be 
faithfully committed to the policy of competitive tendering, among other 
government policies such as the encouragement of commercial medicine. 
Due to the increased centralisation of power such commitment is more 
easily translated into implementation. 
The Impact of Competitive Tendering on Costs and Services 
Scotland is now well into its first round of tendering, with many of the 
contracts six or seven months into their operation. So, it is possible to 
examine how the impact of the process so far measures up to government 
claims of savings and improved efficiency. 
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Savings 
Table 4 gives the figures for savings achieved in ancillary services as a 
result of competitive tendering. These figures were obtained directly from 
individual health boards. 
Table 4 Total Savings Made to Date as a Result of Competitive Tendering (As 
at June 1989) 
Health Board No of Contracts 
Awarded 
Argyll & Clyde 5 





Forth Valley 4 
Grampian 4 

























7. 6 (Catering Only) 
8.0 
6.6 





20.0 (Domestic & 
Catering 
42.0 (Grounds & 
Gardens) 
(Not Available) 
The total savings figure of over £12 million, while considerable, is 
nevertheless far short of the £16 million savings claimed by Michael Forsyth 
{April1989). The most likely reason for this discrepancy is that the Scottish 
Home and Health Department is including in its calculations the savings 
achieved by a number of efficiency programmes which were already in 
operation when competitive tendering was implemented. For example in 
Dumfries and Galloway, of the £500,000 savings it was estimated that just 
£200,000 were directly attributable to competitive tendering. This 
ambiguity is most likely to occur where the contracts have been awarded in-
house. 
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However, this is not likely to be the case where private companies have 
been successful, as a complete take-over makes cost comparisons more 
straightforward, and it is in the areas with a high level of contracting out 
that the greatest savings are claimed. My second and more important 
reservations about these claims is that, as was the case in the first round of 
tendering in England, there are a number of 'hidden costs' which are not 
taken into account when calculating savings. 
(i)Tendering Process 
Perhaps the most obvious costs incurred are the manhours, 
consultancy fees and direct costs (stationary, printing etc) involved in the 
preparation of timetables, drawing up of specifications, and inviting and 
evaluating tenders. Few of the health boards have made any attempt to 
calculate these costs. Those that provided figures are listed below. 
Table 5: Direct Costs of Competitive Tendering Process 
Health Board Savings Cost Note 
Ayrshire & Arran £115,000 £51,000 Relates only to 4 
contracts let in 1988 
Borders £107,400 £17,568 Staff cost only 
i.e. excludesexter-
nal consultancy fees 
Grampian £597,944 £25,242 
A further on-going cost of the process is in the necessary monitoring of 
contract performance but it is virtually impossible to put a figure on this. 
(ii) Severance Payments 
Redundancy costs arising from a given tender are, under DHSS 
guidelines, to be counted as a 'below the line' cost which means they are to 
be recouped against savings over the period of the contract. This clearly 
works to the advantage of private contractors whose redundancy costs 
would otherwise push up the price of their tender. 
Figures for relevant redundancy and early pension payments were 
requested by Sam Galbraith MP in a parliamentary question. The total 
comes to £4.8 million which is payed out of central funds in Scotland. 
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(iii) VAT 
Under Treasury policy health boards may now reclaim VAT which has 
been paid as a result of contracting out any service. Therefore, the 
government is giving up revenue to encourage contracting out. An exact 
figure is very difficult to obtain as the Scottish Office does not collect the 
information and Customs and Excise would not reveal it. However, Bill 
Rankine(24) has estimated that contracts let to private companies in 
Scotland so far, with total value of over £10 million, would incur VAT 
charges of about £1.5 million which have been relinquished by the 
government. 
(iv) Social Security Costs 
Social security payments to former NHS staff who remain unemployed 
are a continuing 'cost' of contracting out. Rankine(ZS) using health board 
figures estimates that 2,500 NHS workers were made redundant and 
around 600 of these remain unemployed. Taking the period of 13 weeks 
from the end of 1988 (when the first private contracts began operation) and 
an average of £80 per week per claimant, the social security costs as at April 
1989 would have come to £620,000. 
(v) Obsolescence of Equipment 
It has also been claimed that allowance should be made for expensive 
NHS cleaning equipment which is lying unused or has been sold off at rock 
bottom prices. 
Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to calculate these costs 
accurately as the necessary official information is not available. Therefore, 
while health board and government claims of savings can neither be proven 
nor disproven they must surely be thrown into considerable doubt. 
Efficiency 
The second major element in the government rhetoric on competitive 
tendering is that it will improve the efficiency of services now facing 
competition with the private sector. We have seen that considerable savings 
have already been made (the extent of which is questionable) which would 
suggest that the services were indeed operating more efficiently. However, 
in the words of Domberger et al(26) "Clearly if cost savings are achieved at 
the expense of lower service standards then we will have overestimated the 
benefits of tendering." 
Competitive tendering in Scotland has now developed sufficiently for 
us to form some idea of whether the problems that have arisen in England 
are also likely to arise here. So far, none of the contracts have actually failed 
and indeed the problems of poor service standards do not seem as 
widespread in Scotland as they were in the first round of tendering in 
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England. The most likely reason for this is the greater proportion of 
successful in-house tenders in Scotland. In these cases reductions in service 
standards have been minimal although staff are finding that they have more 
work to do in less time. 
Serious problems have, however, arisen with some of the private 
contracts. One that has attracted considerable attention is Initial Health 
Care's domestic contract at Edinburgh Royal Infirmary. When the 
company first took over the contract, they had great difficulty in recruiting 
sufficient staff, achieving only 50% of their requirements. These shortages 
seriously impaired the standards of cleaning and on one occasion IHCS had 
to import bus loads of staff from Middlesborough, paying them £150 per 
head per day, to make up the numbers. (NUPE members claim that this has 
been a regular practice, which Initial deny). The company continued to 
suffer recruitment problems despite having taken the unprecedented step 
of putting wages up and introducing a bonus just weeks into the contract 
period(Z?). 
Hospital Hygiene have also had problems with discontented staff. 
After the first month of the contract at Victoria Infirmary, Glasgow, 100 
domestic workers walked out as their pay was overdue and a similar dispute 
was narrowly avoided in their Stobhill contract by guarantees that cheques 
would be delivered(28). 
These incidents are clear indications of the spreading discontentment 
among ancillary staff. While most of the contractors continue to pay the 
Basic Whitley rate of £2.029 per hour (though one contractor in Glasgow 
pays as little as £1.75 per hour) they have cut back hours to such an extent 
that individuals are taking home considerably less pay. This is clearly the 
main source of savings made. 
The combination of staff shortages and the demoralisation of 
remaining staff is proving detrimental to service standards. The Royal 
College of Nursing is continually receiving reports from senior sisters that 
due to unsatisfactory cleaning standards nurses are having to do extra 
cleaning in addition to their own duties. In such cases competitive tendering 
does not only impair the standards of contracted-out service but also puts 
pressure on the resources of the primary service of medical care. 
Conclusion 
The experience of competitive tendering in England has shown that 
the exercise has achieved little in terms of 'efficiency' and 'savings'. 
Evidence from Scotland, while not yet as advanced, already shows that the 
savings made are largely at the expense of the already low paid staff and the 
efficiency of the service has suffered in many cases from severe staff 
shortages resulting from the poor pay and conditions offered. 
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Overall, therefore, the evidence appears to suggest that 'efficiency' is 
not genuinely the government's main interest in competitive tendering. So 
what are the government's real motives, and why is it concentrating so 
emphatically on the rationalisation of support services when there are other 
areas in the NHS where attention could be turned? 
Before answering this we must consider the context in which 
competitive tendering has arisen. The present government is dedicated to a 
programme of privatisation and has been able to sell off a number of public 
industries with relatively little opposition. However, the NHS, the largest 
public sector employer, has proven to be rather different due to its immense 
popularity. This means that attempts to break down the NHS in its present 
form have had to be done by rather less obvious techniques. Competitive 
tendering is one such technique and there are three important ways in 
which it assists this overall attack on the NHS. 
First, competitive tendering aims to break up the NHS into more 
manageable segments. By having support services put to tender, the 
government is trying to undermine the idea that ancillary staff are an 
essential part of the health care team. In the words of David Currie, a 
consultant neurosurgeon in Aberdeen. "Of course, the threat to the 
ancillary services is not really about efficiency or financial savings ... The 
real reason for this piece of sabotage is to prepare the ground for further 
dismantling of the NHS, and Mr Rifkind has placed the ancillary workers in 
the frontline because they are the most vulnerable section of the 
service"<29). 
A second advantage of competitive tendering for the government is 
the weakening effect it will have on the health unions, previously among the 
strongest public sector unions. The government welcomes the introduction 
of private contractors who may or may not chose to recognise existing 
health unions and who will employ a part-time, largely female workforce, 
notoriously difficult to organise. This opinion is clearly supported by the 
right-wing pressure group PULSE (Public and Local Service Efficiency 
Campaign): "Instead of having one monolithic in-house organisation 
providing services there will be a welcome fragmentation and the natural 
consequence of that is decreasing unionisation. The unions may continue to 
have members in the firms involved but competition means that they know 
there are other companies available to do the job if they go on strike"<30>. 
This weakening in union power will leave ancillary workers increasingly 
vulnerable to squeezing on their already low wages. 
Finally, it is the government's intention to aid the advancement of the 
private sector. The preference of the Scottish Office for contracts being 
awarded to private tenderers has never been in doubt. Minutes of the 
Highland Health Board meeting (18112/87) state that boards "were 
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expected to concentrate on areas where the most attractive financial 
packages could be presented to commercial contractors"<31>. This would 
surely suggest that the Scottish Office gives the interests of the contractors a 
definite priority over the wider interests of the Health Service. 
These three factors, the fragmentation of the NHS workforce, the 
weakening of the health unions and the furtherance of the private sector, 
are the underlying objectives behind the government's insistence on the 
implementation of competitive tendering. Though the process has clearly 
done little to improve efficiency as government rhetoric claimed it would, 
in terms of these underlying objectives it might be seen as a success. Such 
objectives have been achieved at the expense of the low paid ancillary 
workers and to the detriment of NHS users who are having to accept 
increasingly low standards from a service that has been stretched to the 
limit. 
Ruth Fletcher, Training and Employment Research Unit, University of 
Glasgow. 
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